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1. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to present the results of the study of the patterns and
directions of company finance in Japanese manufacturing industry in years 1988–2003;
quantify these tendencies, and where possible, to explain the variables which determine capital
structure in these companies. It is empirical study on the relationship between capital
structure determinants and models of debt-equity capital structure of Japanese manufacturing
industry.
In the literature the costs and benefits of debt versus equity financing are usually well
identified. The issue of what firms ought to borrow has been adequately researched in the
related literature1).
The firm markets its real assets and operating income to investors by issuing a package of
financial assets. A firm makes capital structure choices to possibly minimize costs of capital
and to evaluate the impact that capital financing may have on various areas of firm’s activity:
the capital structure’s impact on firm’s profitability (internal or external; fixed or floated;
secured or unsecured; short-term, mid-term or long-term financing and also the best mix of
currencies), its competitive power (i.e. share of sales), and export (which of financing decisions
are export stimulating; increase competitive power on domestic and international markets).
There is also a significant, but hard to measure, impact of financial structure on the two
other decisions in corporate finance i.e. dividend policy and investments. Much more
complex problem and much less measurable is the impact of financing decisions on the
* Graduate student; Hiroshima Shudo University, Faculty of Economic Sciences.
1) For example: Stiglitz, J. P ‘A Re-Examination of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem’ American
Economic Review, vol 59, p. 784–93, 1969, Cohen, R. D. ‘An Implication of Modigliani -Miller
Capital Structuring Theorems on the Relation between Equity and Debt’, Sheridan T. ‘The
Modigliani and Miller Theorem and Market Efficiency’ National Bureau of Economic Research,
Working paper 8641, 2001.
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company’s global strategies: financial, marketing, production and human resources. It is still
impossible to state which one of them is a key strategy and also fully understand the
relationship between dividend policy, investments and capital structure.
A number of correlation analyses were used to investigate the determinants of Japanese
companies’ capital structure and to test hypotheses based on the theory of capital structure2).
The variables have been considered regarding Tradeoff Theory, Pecking Order Hypothesis,
Agency Theory and other established capital structure models. The choice of determinants
that may affect capital structure (profitability, size, expected growth, uniqueness, tangibility,
non-debt tax shield, dividend and market to book ratio) is based on the capital structure
theories presented in section 3 below.
Data description
The materials used in this study are derived from four volumes of Japan Company Hand-
book: Summer 1989 First section, Autumn 1994 First Section, Winter 1999 First Section, and
Summer 2003 First Section published by Toyo Keizai Inc. Although there exist other reliable
sources of data, such as Ministry of Finance I used Toyo Keizai Japan Company Handbook
because it offered the most comprehensive data in terms of Japanese industry structure3).
Thirteen manufacturing industries have been chosen for this study. The data, such as
“Sales”, “Earnings per Share — (EPS)” and “Dividend per Share — (DPS)” were extracted
from the company’s financial statements. “EPS” was obtained by dividing net profit by the
total number of issued shares at the close of the settlement term. “DPS” was treated as the
total of the mid-term and term-end dividends. Ordinary dividends were most common,
however, there are also special dividends, commemorative dividends and stock dividends
regarded here. “Total Assets” included all assets possessed by the company and is composed
of total of current assets, fixed assets, and deferred assets. The figure of “Total Assets” is
equal to the total of liabilities and capital. “Shareholders’ Equity” was extracted from the
2) For similar study see: Allen, D. E., ‘The Pecking-Order Hypothesis: Australian Evidence’, School
of Economics and Finance, University of Technology Perth WA, 1992, Baskin, J. B., ‘An
Empirical Investigation of the Pecking Order Hypothesis’, Financial Management, 18, 1989,
Baskin, J. B., ‘On the Financial Policy of Large Mature Corporations’, Ph. D Dissertation,
Harvard University, Department of Economics, 1985, Han Suck Song, ‘Capital Structure
Determinants, an Empirical Study of Swedish Companies’, the Royal Institute of Technology,
2005, and Nishioka, S. and Baba, N., ‘Dynamic Capital Structure of Japanese Firms’, Bank of
Japan, 2004.
3) Other sources did not include such data as depreciation, research and development expenditures.
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capital part of the balance sheet and was obtained by adding surplus to capital stock and legal
reserves. “Borrowings” represent so-called interest-bearing liabilities, namely the total of
short and long–term borrowings (including commercial papers), short-term bonds, convertible
bonds and warrant bonds. “Return on Assets - ROA” was calculated as ratio of pre-tax profits
to total assets. “Employees” indicate the number of regular full-time employees of the parent
firm, excluding temporary employees, outside workers, and members of the board of directors
in principle.
Because of a relatively extensive nature of the study it was necessary to introduce certain
structural and methodological limitations here. The first one is that the sample does not
include financial companies, which operate on functionally different financial strategies from
these of manufacturing sector4). The sample of study consists only of the biggest, interna-
tional manufacturing companies. This is due to the fact that manufacturing companies are
product, innovation and technology leaders for the rest of Japanese industry. They are also
leading in marketing and advertising and hence, considering the process of financing decisions,
may be regarded as good representatives of the whole industry. These companies dominate
corporate sector in terms of capital concentration, and output volume.
The other limitation refers to the data collected for this study, which do not include, in
1988, corporate bonds, convertible bonds and warrants as in case of the data from 2003. The
reason of not including them in 1988-1999 samples was the lack of such data and the fact of
low level of corporate bond and warrant markets at that period, its small impact on company
financial behavior5). The level of corporate borrowings in 1988-1999 is therefore represented
by the amount of bank borrowings. It may result in certain qualifications when making
comparison with 2003 sample but has no impact on the results of study for the 1988-1999
samples. As all companies in the sample were affected in the same way, the lack of corporate
bond data will not have any significant impact on the validity and consistency of the
correlations derived from this analysis.
The other limitation is that all corporate borrowings are aggregated without making
distinction between long and short-term borrowings. The division between short-term and
4) For example, the high debt ratios of firms from banking and finance sectors reflect the nature of
their activities as well as any preferences they may have for funding sources.
5) Michaelas et. al. find that most of the determinants of capital structure (e.g. size, profitability,
growth, and more) seem to be relevant for both short-term and long-term debt ratios, see:
Michaelas, N., Chittenden, F. and Poutziouris, P., ‘Financial Policy and Capital Structure Choice
in U. K.: Empirical Evidence from Company Panel Data, Small Business Economics, 1999.
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long-term debt is obviously a significant and important feature from accounting, auditing and
corporate accounting management point of view. The focus of this study is, however, on
corporate finance from economic and aggregated point of view, hence more detailed
accounting analysis is not conducted here6). Three important variables, such as tangibility,
debt cost and market to book ratio are not available for Toyo Keizai, and I will use the data
from other source. The choice for 1988 and 2003 statistical samples is not coincidental.
Year 1988 marks the peak of the financial bubble in Japan and comparing the financial
conditions of companies from that period with 2003 will re-emphasize the contrasts between
these two extreme periods.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief overview of some
commonly used leverage measures. Data on financial leverage of Japanese manufacturing
companies based on the data set are also presented there. Section 3 reviews major capital
structure determinants suggested by the theory of finance. Section 4 presents statistics for
those determinants based on the data set and discusses the interpretation and significance of the
estimates. Finally, section 5 summarizes and concludes the main findings of this paper.
2. Measures of capital structure/financial leverage
The term “capital structure” refers to the mix of different types of securities (long-term
debt, common stock, preferred stock) issued by a company to finance its assets. The term
“unlevered company” refers to the company having no debt, while a firm with debt in its
capital structure is “leveraged company”. “Financial leverage” increases firm’s financial risk
and is chosen as dependant variable in this study. Because many articles have been written
about capital structure and its determinants since the MM Theory, there exist different
measures of capital structure. Table 1 lists the different measures of leverage and each
measures pros and cons suggested in the literature.
In measuring leverage, one can include or exclude accounts payable, accounts receivable,
cash, and other short-term debt. Some studies measure leverage as a ratio of book value of debt
6) However, some commentators on company financing argue that a fuller understanding of capital
structure and its determinants requires a detailed analysis of all form of corporate debt. In this
study coefficients of correlation instead of panel data regression were used. The latter method
would reveal interesting relationships already within the group of indicated determinants in this
paper. From this, important discussions on the relationship between financial systems, corporate
debt structure and growth might be based upon.
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to book value of equity, others as book value of debt to market value of equity, still others as
debt to market value of equity plus book value of debt9). In addition to measurement
problems, there are the usual problems with interpreting statistical results’10). For this study I
Table 1　Different measures of leverage and corresponding pros and cons, according to Rajan 
and Zingales (1995)7)
+ The broadest definition of leverage; proxy for what is left for shareholders in 
case of liquidation.
Total liabilities /
Total assets – Not a good indication of whether the firm is at risk of default in the near future.
– May overstate leverage since total liabilities include items like accounts pay-
able, untaxed reserves, etc.
+ Does not include liabilities like untaxed reserves or account payable (for transac-
tion purposes); more appropriate measure of leverage that aboveTotal debt / Total 
assets
– Affected by level of trade (i.e. unpaid bills; makes up bulk of accounts payable)
+ Not influenced by trade credit.8) (Net assets = total assets – account payable – 
other liabilities).Total debt / Net 
assets
– Still affected by factors that have nothing to do with financing, e.g. assets held 
against pension liabilities.
+ Probably the best representation of past financing decisions (capital = total debt 
+ equity)Total debt / Capital
+ Measure of the risk that equity holders will not be able to make fixed payments 
and will have to give up control.　Appropriate measure if investments equal in 
magnitude to depreciation needed to keep the firm a going concern.
Earnings Before 
Interest and Taxes /
Interest expense
– Based in assumption that short-term liabilities like accounts payable and short-
term debt will be rolled over.　Very sensitive to income fluctuations.
+ Measure of the risk that equity holders will not be able to make fixed payment 
and will have to give up control.　Appropriate if no such investments as above 
are needed
Earnings Before 
Interest and Taxes
+ Depreciation /
Interest expense
– same as above
Source: Rajan, R.G., and L. Zingales, ‘What do we know about capital structure?　Some evidence 
from international data’, Journal of Finance, 50, 1995.
7) In addition to the leverage measures depicted in table 1, there exist other leverage measures; for
instance, the ratio of total debt to equity, the ratio of only long-term debt to assets, and so on.
8) The term trade credit may be confusing, since it is an item that belongs to short-term debt, and in
particular to accounts payable. It trade credit is used for financing purposes rather than for
transactions, trade credit should be included in measures of leverage.
9) Rajan, R. G., and L. Zingales, ‘What do we know about capital structure? Some evidence from
international data’, Journal of Finance, 50, 1995.
10) Harris, M., Raviv, A., ‘Theory of capital structure and technical change’, Journal of Finance, 46,
1991.
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have chosen the ratio of total debt over total assets and total debt over capital (total debt +
equity) as two leverage measures. Table 2 presents these ratios for Japanese manufacturing
industry in years 1988–2003.
3. Determinants of capital structure
In the related literature there is some degree of disagreements over the issue of how a
given determinant may affect company’s leverage11). Here I choose eight, the most commonly
used determinants of capital structure: such as profitability, size, uniqueness, expected growth,
Table 2　Leverage for Japanese Manufacturing Industry 1988–2003
2. Debt / Total assets1. Debt / (Debt + Equity)
INDUSTRY
2003–198820031999199319882003–19882003199919931988
– 11%26%34%23%37%– 21%36%44%37%58%textile & apparel
2%39%53%34%37%– 7%53%64%50%61%pulp & paper
0%30%32%20%30%– 12%45%41%34%57%chemicals
1%4%9%3%3%– 1%5%11%5%6%pharmaceuticals
– 11%28%26%26%38%– 12%49%49%47%61%oil&coal products
1%25%29%20%24%– 6%39%36%34%45%rubber products
4%31%31%13%27%2%42%39%21%40%glass & ceramics
7%41%38%19%34%2%58%49%36%55%steel products
4%18%21%5%14%1%27%30%10%27%metal products
11%32%29%14%21%9%52%46%28%43%machinery
2%24%24%8%22%13%49%37%16%36%electr. machinery
10%34%26%14%23%19%63%42%31%43%transport equip.
15%27%30%8%12%18%39%37%14%21%precision instr.
3%27%30%16%25%0%43%40%28%43%average
Source: Calculations based on data from Japan Company Handbook (first section): summer 1989, 
autumn 1994, winter 1999 and summer 2003 Toyo Keizai Inc.
11) For example: Nishioka, S. and Baba, N., ‘Dynamic Capital Structure of Japanese Firms’, Bank of
Japan, 2004, Berger, A. and Udell, G., ‘Lines of credit, collateral, and relationship lending in
small firm finance’, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1994, Rajan, R. and
Zingales, L., ‘What do we know about capital structure? Some evidence from international
data,’ Journal of Finance, 1995, Glen, J., ‘Capital Structure, Rates of Return and Financing
Corporate Growth: Comparing Developed and Emerging Markets, 1994–00,’ University of
Cambridge, 2003, Titman, S. Wessels, R., ‘The Determinants of Capital Structure‘, Journal of
Finance, 43, 1988, Harris, M., Raviv, A., ‘Theory of capital structure and technical change’,
Journal of Finance, 46, 1991, Prasad, S., Green, C. J. and Murinde, V., ‘Company Financing,
Capital Structure, and Ownership: A Survey, and Implications for Developing Economies’,
Loughborough University, 2001.
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tangibility, non-debt tax shield, dividend, and market to book value. The coefficients of
correlation were measured to investigate relationship between capital structure determinants
and models of debt equity capital structure. Two different leverage measures have been
applied: 1) total debt to total assets and, 2) total debt to capital (where capital is the sum of debt
and equity).
3.1 Profitability
The pecking order theory (asymmetric-information hypothesis, signaling theory), based on
works by Myers and Majluf suggests that firms display a certain pecking order in the choice of
financing sources. Roughly, this theory states that firms prefer internal funds over external
funds. If external finance is required, the first choice is to issue debt, then possibly issue
hybrid securities such as convertible bonds, then issue eventually equity as a last resort. This
behavior may be due to the costs of issuing new equity, as a result of asymmetric information
or transaction costs12). My intention is to investigate whether the predictions of the static
optimal capital structure theory (bankruptcy cost hypothesis) hold. The static theory would
predict a significant positive correlation between profitability and debt ratios, since high
performance firms have less expected bankruptcy costs. Free-cash-flow hypothesis also
predicts a positive coefficient. By contrast, the pecking-order hypothesis would be consistent
with a significant negative correlation, i.e. high profit firms should have a lower leverage13).
Here, I use the return on assets as a measure of profitability. Also earnings per share could be
used as a proxy for profitability. Statistical results of the relationship between EPS and
leverage are also presented here, however, it has low explanatory power in case of the
companies whose share amount is limited, which is often case in Japan. I suspect there will
12) Majluf, N. and Myers, S., ‘Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have
Information Investors Do Not Have’, Journal of Financial Economics, 13, 1984. for empirical
study see, for example: Baskin, J. B., ‘On the Financial Policy of Large Mature Corporations’,
Ph. D Dissertation, Harvard University, Department of Economics, 1985, Baskin, J. B., ‘An
Empirical Investigation of the Pecking Order Hypothesis’, Financial Management, 18, 1989.
13) for conflicting theories see: Brealey, R. and Myers. S. C., ‘Principles of Corporate Finance.
Fourth Edition. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991, Rajan, R. and Zingales, L., ‘What Do We know
about Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International Data’, Journal of Finance, 50, 1995,
Majluf, N. and Myers, S., ‘Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have
Information Investors Do Not Have’, Journal of Financial Economics, 13, 1984 and Jensen, M. C.
and W. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Capital
Structure’, Journal of Financial Economics, 3 October 1976 (Jensen predicts a positive
relationship if the market for corporate control is effective).
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be a significant negative relationship between profitability and debt ratios. (This would support
the pecking-order hypothesis and run counter to the static optimal capital structure theory and
free-cash-flow hypotheses).
3.2 Size
In corporate finance literature there is a certain disagreement on how company size may
affect financial leverage14). If companies with excess debt ratios have higher costs of
bankruptcy and financial distress, then size may be an inverse proxy for the probability of
bankruptcy, since larger firms are more likely to be more diversified and fail less often.
Accordingly, larger firms may issue debt at lower costs than smaller firms. In this case,
therefore, it could be expected that company size be positively related to financial leverage.
However, there are other conflicting views arguing that there may be less asymmetric
information about large firms, since these firms tend to provide more information to outside
investors than smaller firms. Lower asymmetry costs should, therefore, increase their
preference for equity relative to debt15). Also, large firms often have a more dispersed
ownership structure compared to smaller firms. Therefore, higher the ownership dispersion
level the more negative influence on debt. This is because to have more control of a firm, the
investor must have relatively big package of shares. There are many representative variables
representing the size, for instance, sales, number of people employed or size of total assets.
Here, I use sales over total assets and level of employment over total assets as a measure for
size. I suspect, there will be a significant negative relationship between size and debt ratios.
(This would support the governance structure and agency cost hypothesis and pecking-order
hypothesis and run counter to the static optimal capital structure).
3.3 Uniqueness
There are some conflicting views on the relationship between leverage and uniqueness
factor. According to the pecking order theory the positive relationship between uniqueness
14) Berger, A. and Udell, G., ‘Lines of credit, collateral, and relationship lending in small firm
finance’, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1994, Rajan, R. and Zingales, L.,
‘What do we know about capital structure? Some evidence from international data’, Journal of
Finance, 1995, and Glen, J., ‘Capital Structure, Rates of Return and Financing Corporate Growth:
Comparing Developed and Emerging Markets, 1994–00’, University of Cambridge, 2003.
15) For the theories see: Rajan, R. and Zingales, L., ‘What Do We know about Capital Structure?
Some Evidence from International Data’, Journal of Finance, 50, 1995 and Fama and Jensen,
‘Separation of Ownership and Control’, Journal of Law Economics, 1983.
The Determinants of Capital Structure, an Empirical Study of Japanese Companies
―　　―249
and financial leverage could be expected because investments in research and development
implies a higher demand for funds and a greater preference on external financing through the
preferred source of debt16). On the other hand, the more unique a firm’s asset (financed from
R&D expenditures) the ‘thinner‘ the market for such assets17). Accordingly the lower is the
expected value recoverable by a lender in the event of a bankruptcy. Here a negative
dependence could be expected between uniqueness and leverage. Uniqueness will be
measured as a ratio of research and development expenditures over sales.
3.4 Expected growth
Relationship between expected growth and leverage seems to be similar to this between
uniqueness and leverage. Here, We can also expect a positive relationship (between expected
growth and leverage) due to higher demand for funds. However, it is plausible that the
relationship might be negative due to higher cost of financial distress (under investment
hypothesis)18). The proxy for expected growth is the ratio of investments over total assets.
For this determinant also a negative dependence is expected. This would support the static
optimal capital structure theory (costs of financial distress, under investment hypothesis and
conflicts to the pecking-order hypothesis).
3.5 Tangibility19)
According to agency cost theory models the relationship between assets’ tangibility and
capital structure is based on the presumed conflict that exists between lenders and shareholders.
This theory asserts that conflicts between lenders and shareholders create incentives for
shareholders to invest in suboptimal way. Therefore, lenders take actions to protect them-
selves by requiring tangible assets as collateral.
Many valuable fixed assets should give a higher debt ratio, because the firm can offer
security for loans. Firms, which can offer collateral will be charged lower interest rates than
16) Majluf, N. and Myers, S., ‘Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have
Information Investors Do Not Have’, Journal of Financial Economics, 13, 1984.
17) Titman, S. and Wessels, R., ‘The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice’, Journal of Finance,
43, 1988, Titman, S., ‘The Effect of Capital Structure on a Firm’s Liquidation Decision’, Journal
of Financial Economics, 3, 1984, and Rao, N. and Lukose, J., ‘An Empirical Study on the
Determinants of the Capital Structure of Listed Indian Firms’, 2002
18) Myers, S. C., ‘Determinants of Corporate Borrowing’, Journal of Financial Economics, 5, 1977.
19) Data for this variable are derived from: Nishioka, S. and Baba, N., ‘Dynamic Capital Structure of
Japanese Firms’, Bank of Japan, 2004.
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firms that do not have any security to offer (in addition to the future cash flow).
Also, according to the static optimal capital structure theory, the bankruptcy costs should
limit borrowings of risky firms whose value depends on intangible assets. For the company
with intangible assets the losses are much greater. The losses to assets that are linked to the
condition of the firm as a going concern, e.g. technology, growth opportunities, and human
capital, become higher. Therefore, it is important for the company to optimize debt because
of the potential value that may be lost20). The significant positive relationship between
tangibility and debt ratios is expected (this would support the agency cost theory and optimal
static capital structure theory — bankruptcy cost).
3.6 Non-debt tax shield
According to Modigliani and Miller, interest tax shields create strong incentives for firms
to increase leverage. The size of non-debt related corporate tax shields like tax deductions for
depreciation and investment tax credits may affect leverage. It is argued that such non-debt
tax shields are substitutes for the tax benefits of debt financing. Therefore, the tax advantage
of leverage decreases when other tax deductions like depreciation increase. It is expected that
an increase in non-debt tax shields will affect leverage negatively. As measure of non-debt
tax shield I use the ratio of depreciation over total assets and expect a significant negative
relationship between non-debt tax shield and debt ratios (this would support the optimal static
capital structure theory – (corporate tax shield)).
3.7 Dividend
It is argued that a firm paying out dividends can be kept in the capital market21). Firms,
which simultaneously pay out dividends and raise debt must do this because they need to signal
their quality to the equity capital market. The basic idea behind Miller and Rock theory is
20) For the theory see: Myers, S. C., ‘Determinants of Corporate Borrowing’, Journal of Financial
Economics, 5, 1977, Harris, M., Raviv, A., ‘Theory of capital structure and technical change’,
Journal of Finance, 46, 1991, ensen, M. C. and W. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Capital Structure’, Journal of Financial Economics, 3 October 1976
and Michaelas, N., Chittenden, F. and Poutziouris, P., ‘Financial Policy and Capital Structure
Choice in U. K.: Empirical Evidence from Company Panel Data, Small Business Economics,
1999.
21) It is an argument for the existence of dividend. The monitoring of management is less costly in
the capital market. If a firm does not report to truthfully to the capital market, the social cost of
monitoring will be exceedingly large. See: Easterbrook, F. H., ‘Two Agency-cost Explanations
of Dividends’, American Economic Review, 74, 1992.
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that dividends give a credible signal of firm quality because they cost inefficient firms more
than efficient firms in terms of reduced investments, thus reducing the future value of the
firm22). The negative correlation between dividend and leverage can be taken as evidence that
dividend-paying firms have less debt because they need less debt than the other firms. The
positive correlation would mean that firms prefer to pay out dividends while having much debt
because they need to be in the capital market to obtain cost-efficient monitoring of their
management23).
I expect a significant negative relationship between dividend and debt ratios (this would
support 1) prediction that dividend-paying firms have less debt because they need less debt
than the other firms, 2) pecking order theory and counter 3) the prediction that firms prefer to
pay out dividends while having much debt because they need to be in the capital market to
obtain cost-efficient monitoring of their management, 4) agency theory and 5) static optimal
capital structure theory recommendations).
3.8 Market to book ratio
Market to book ratio is the ratio of market value to book value of equity and is a proxy for
investment opportunities24). Firms with high-market to book ratios tend to grow quickly.
They pass up promising projects and tend to lower leverage. The market timing hypothesis
also indicates a negative sign between market-to-book ratio and leverage because firms with
high market-to-book ratios have an incentive to take advantage of high/low equity prices to
issue/repurchase equities. On the other hand, a positive sign could be expected since a higher
market-to-book ratio shows a higher expected growth rate of firm value. According to the
static optimal capital structure firms have their target debt-to-equity ratios and in order to
adjust the leverage to rise in stock price company should raise more debt or sell stocks25).
22) Miller, M. and Rock, K., ‘Dividend policy under asymmetric information’, Journal of Finance,
40, 1985.
23) See: Dahalival, D., Li O., Moser, W., ‘Dividend Taxes and Implied Cost of Equity Capital’,
University of Arizona, 2004. In the literature dividend is also often used as a proxy for equity
cost.
24) Data are derived from: Nishioka, S. and Baba, N., ‘Dynamic Capital Structure of Japanese Firms’,
Bank of Japan, 2004.
25) See: Stulz, R., ‘Managerial Discretion and Optimal Financing Policies’, Journal of Financial
Economics, 26, 1990, Myers, S. C., ‘Determinants of Corporate Borrowing’, Journal of Financial
Economics, 5, 1977, Merton, R., ‘On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: ‘The Risk Structure of
Interest Rates’, Journal of Finance 29, 1974. Data are derived from: Nishioka, S. and Baba, N.,
‘Dynamic Capital Structure of Japanese Firms’, Bank of Japan, 2004.
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Table 3 Potential determinants of capital structure, corresponding measures, and hypothetic 
effect on leverage
HYPOTHETIC EFFECT ON LEVERAGEMEASURE (PROXY)DETERMINANT
a significant positive relationship (supports static optimal 
capital structure theory and free-cash-flow hypotheses)
a significant negative relationship (supports the pecking-
order hypothesis)
1. return on assets
2. earnings per share 
over total assets
Profitability1
a significant positive relationship (supports static opti-
mal capital structure theory)
a significant negative relationship (supports agency cost 
hypothesis and pecking order hypothesis)
1.sales over total 
assets and
2.employment over 
total assets
Size2
a significant positive relationship (supports pecking-
order hypothesis)
a significant negative relationship (supports the static 
optimal capital structure theory (costs of financial dis-
tress))
research and develop-
ment expenditures 
over sales
Uniqueness3
a significant positive relationship (supports pecking-
order hypothesis)
a significant negative relationship (supports the static 
optimal capital structure theory (costs of financial dis-
tress, under investment hypothesis)
investments over total 
assets
Expected growth4
a significant positive relationship (supports the agency 
cost theory and optimal static capital structure theory – 
bankruptcy cost)
ratio of tangible 
assets
Tangibility5
a significant negative relationship (supports the optimal 
static capital structure theory – (corporate tax shield))
depreciation over 
total assets
Non-debt tax 
shield6
a significant positive relationship (supports static trade-
off theory, agency cost and governance structure
a significant negative (supports pecking order theory)
dividend per share 
over total assetsDividend7
a significant positive relationship (supports static opti-
mal capital structure theory)
a significant negative relationship (supports the market 
timing and agency hypotheses)
market value to book 
value of equity
Market to book 
ratio8
Source: Based on reviewed literature
Table 3 presents the set of potential determinants of capital structure, corresponding
measures and hypothetic effect on leverage.
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4. Analysis of Hypothesized Effects on Debt-ratio
Correlation analysis has been used to identify and measure the factors affecting capital
structure and their relationship with debt equity capital structure models. The conflicting
recommendations of the capital structure models (Tradeoff Theory, the Pecking Order
Hypothesis, the Agency Theory, the Market Timing Hypothesis and other established capital
structure models) were confronted with Japanese companies’ financing decisions. There were
eight determinants of capital structure: 1) profitability, 2) size, 3) uniqueness, 4) growth
opportunity, 5) tangibility, 6) non-debt tax shield, 7) dividend, and 8) market to book value26).
The results suggest that the capital structure of the Japanese manufacturing industry is
significantly affected by: profitability, dividend, tangibility, market-to-book ratio and size.
The only variables suggested by theoretical and empirical literature that seem not to affect
capital structure of Japanese manufacturing industries are: uniqueness, growth opportunities
and non-debt tax shield variable.
In general, as for the results of this study, some recommendations, especially of the
pecking order, agency cost and governance structure (less in case of static optimal capital
structure hypothesis) seem to be supported. Among control variables, profitability and
dividend have high explanatory power as a proxy for pecking-order theory.
4.1 Profitability
The results of this study reveal that profitability is a significant determinant of leverage
(see table 4 and 5). All correlations whose t value is higher than 2.31 have noted negative
values (see table 4). The strongest correlations in 1988 were displayed by textile and apparel
(– 0.8957), machinery (– 0.8722), glass and ceramics (– 0.8438), and oil and coal products
(– 0.8413), in 1993 by precision instruments (– 0.8344), chemicals (– 0.7645) and textile and
apparel (– 0.7264), in 1999 by precision instruments (– 0.8174) and pulp and paper (– 0.7689),
and in 2003 by textile and apparel (– 0.8548) and electrical machinery (– 0.7910). The
biggest changes in time were observed in case of rubber products (0.5497) and metal industry
(– 0.1775). The average for 1988 is the strongest (– 0.7217). There are four examples of
industries that kept strong negative values of coefficients during all or almost all period. They
26) Because of the lack of date concerning debt cost, tangibility and market-to-book ratio, I have used
the data from other studies to analyze these variables.
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are: textile and apparel, pulp and paper, electric machinery and precision instruments.
In terms of averages, there are similar results in measuring relationship between
profitability and financial leverage using debt to total assets as a leverage variable (see table
5). However, there are significant differences for individual industries — fewer industries
displaying strong negative correlations in more than two periods (only textile and apparel and
precision instruments, comparing with four industries when leverage was measured as the ratio
of debt to capital).
Table 4 Coefficients of Correlation: Profitability / Financial Leverage in 13 Japanese 
Manufacturing Industries 1988–2003
r(RETURN ON ASSETS, DEBT / (DEBT + EQUITY)
INDUSTRY
2003–19882003199919931988
0.0408– 0.8548– 0.3795– 0.7264– 0.8957textile & apparel
– 0.0101– 0.6252– 0.7689– 0.6062– 0.6151pulp & paper
0.2930– 0.4937– 0.4840– 0.7645– 0.7867chemicals
– 0.0083– 0.5649– 0.7426– 0.7189– 0.5566pharmaceuticals
0.1312– 0.7101– 0.4308– 0.0718– 0.8413oil&coal products
0.54970.0345– 0.1165– 0.3321– 0.5152rubber products
0.4618– 0.38190.09830.1634– 0.8438glass & ceramics
0.3253– 0.4899– 0.2964– 0.3754– 0.8152steel products
– 0.1775– 0.6780– 0.3246– 0.3447– 0.5005metal products
0.2459– 0.6263– 0.5502– 0.2695– 0.8722machinery
– 0.1440– 0.7910– 0.7458– 0.1693– 0.6470electrical machinery
0.2125– 0.4507– 0.55510.0824– 0.6632transport equipment
0.2532– 0.5766– 0.8174– 0.8344– 0.8298precision instruments
0.1672– 0.5545– 0.4703– 0.3821– 0.7217average
– 0.2946– 0.5121– 0.4688– 0.3997– 0.2175for all industries
Note: bold font indicates the t-value for probability p = 0.0527)
Source: Calculations based on data from Japan Company Handbook (first section): sum-
mer 1989, autumn 1994, winter 1999 and summer 2003 Toyo Keizai Inc.
27) The tables with coefficients of correlation include the results of the T-test for each examined
coefficient of correlation. In most cases in this study there are 8 degrees of freedom (and over
120 in case of coefficients for all industries). I assume a probability of p = 0.05 (95%
probability of making a correct statement – i.e. debt and one of examined variable are highly
correlated) the critical value of the Student‘s test for eight degrees of freedom is t = 2.31. The
coefficients than reached the value of T-test greater than 2.31 are indicated in the tables by the
bold font. However, because of the limited space the lines of regression for these coefficients
are not included in this paper and bolded values are just to indicate the significant relationships
between debt and examined variable.
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Table 5 Coefficients of Correlation: Profitability / Financial Leverage in 13 Japanese 
Manufacturing Industries 1988–2003
r(RETURN ON ASSETS, DEBT/TOTAL ASSETS)
2003–19882003199919931988
– 0.0689– 0.8631– 0.4296– 0.7739– 0.7942textile & apparel
– 0.1247– 0.5947– 0.6783– 0.7363– 0.4701pulp & paper
0.0907– 0.4300– 0.4873– 0.7839– 0.5207chemicals
0.0049– 0.5766– 0.7566– 0.7323– 0.5815pharmaceuticals
0.0514– 0.7192– 0.3188– 0.2133– 0.7706oil&coal products
0.56390.0456– 0.1287– 0.3333– 0.5183rubber products
0.3361– 0.44350.10840.1565– 0.7796glass & ceramics
0.3913– 0.4102– 0.3158– 0.4284– 0.8014steel products
– 0.2469– 0.6957– 0.2561– 0.4289– 0.4488metal products
0.3386– 0.4983– 0.3203– 0.1634– 0.8369machinery
– 0.2999– 0.8425– 0.6400– 0.1611– 0.5426electrical machinery
0.3138– 0.3002– 0.5931– 0.0638– 0.6140transport equipment
0.3314– 0.5187– 0.8520– 0.8434– 0.8501precision instruments
0.1294– 0.5267– 0.4360– 0.4235– 0.6561average
– 0.3079– 0.4882– 0.4600– 0.4834– 0.1803for all industries
Source: Calculations based on data from Japan Company Handbook (first section): sum-
mer 1989, autumn 1994, winter 1999 and summer 2003 Toyo Keizai Inc.
In case of earnings per share all strong correlations were negative (see table 6). In 1988
the strongest negative correlations were displayed by steel products (– 0.8193) and chemicals
(– 0.816), in 1993 by chemicals (– 0.8941), and steel products (– 0.7972), in 1999 again by
chemicals (– 0.8396), and in 2003 by steel products (– 0.8939), electrical machinery (– 0.796)
and rubber products (– 0.7734). The biggest negative changes in correlations were observed
in electrical machinery and precision instruments (respectively, from – 0.222 and – 0.092 in
1988 to – 0.796 and – 0.6332 in 2003). Although there are many negative correlations in all
periods, sample from 2003 displayed strong negative coefficients in almost all cases (average
correlation in 2003 was – 0.625 comparing – 0.48 from other periods). There are five
industries that displayed strong negative values of coefficients during almost all period: textile
and apparel, pulp and paper, chemicals, oil and coal products, and steel products.
With regard to debt to total assets, average correlations are similar to these obtained by
using debt to capital (see table 7). Here, the difference in values of coefficients (between
average for 2003 and averages for remaining periods) is bigger (– 0.634 in 2003 and – 0.45 in
years 1988–1999). Pulp and paper, chemicals, steel products and transport equipment
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displayed negative correlations of 1988–2003.
The relationship between profitability and leverage is negative and significant for many
industries. This means that profitability may be used as a proxy for the availability of internal
funds (as suggested by pecking-order theory). These findings are also supported by other
studies of corporate capital structure28). The negative correlations here may also suggest an
argument that the pecking order hypothesis is closer to empirical studies than the static optimal
capital structure theory and free-cash-flow hypothesis. According to pecking order hypothesis
firms prefer retained earnings over external finance. Hence, good profitability reduces the
need for external capital in form of a debt contract. The signs of coefficients of correlation do
not seem to support the static optimal capital structure theory. Obtained results are consistent
with a significant negative, as opposed to positive, relationship between profitability and
28) For example: Hirota, S., ‘Are Corporate Financing Decisions Different in Japan? An Empirical
Study on Capital Structure’, IFMP Discussion Paper, 1998, Nishioka, S. and Baba, N., ‘Dynamic
Capital Structure of Japanese Firms’, Bank of Japan, 2004, Han Suck Song, ‘Capital Structure
Determinants, an Empirical Study of Swedish Companies’, the Royal Institute of Technology,
2005
Table 6 Coefficients of Correlation: Earnings per share/Financial Leverage in 13 Japanese 
Manufacturing Industries 1988–2003
r(EARNINGS PER SHARE / TOTAL ASSETS, DEBT / (DEBT + EQUITY)
INDUSTRY
change: 2003–19882003199919931988
– 0.0232– 0.6363– 0.4596– 0.6855– 0.6132textile & apparel
– 0.1062– 0.6387– 0.6847– 0.7627– 0.5325pulp & paper
0.1781– 0.6379– 0.8396– 0.8941– 0.8160chemicals
– 0.1499– 0.5986– 0.0897– 0.1688– 0.4486pharmaceuticals
0.0357– 0.6275– 0.6626– 0.6634– 0.6632oil&coal products
– 0.3158– 0.7734– 0.4229– 0.0356– 0.4576rubber products
– 0.0853– 0.6389– 0.2566– 0.3305– 0.5537glass & ceramics
– 0.0746– 0.8939– 0.4622– 0.7972– 0.8193steel products
– 0.1823– 0.4950– 0.6468– 0.5251– 0.3127metal products
0.0428– 0.5578– 0.3032– 0.0591– 0.6007machinery
– 0.5740– 0.7960– 0.4180– 0.3201– 0.2220electrical machinery
– 0.0295– 0.1978– 0.4797– 0.5627– 0.1684transport equipment
– 0.5412– 0.6332– 0.5448– 0.5534– 0.0920precision instruments
– 0.1404– 0.6250– 0.4823– 0.4891– 0.4846average
0.0364– 0.2442– 0.3928– 0.2379– 0.2806for all industries
Source: Calculations based on data from Japan Company Handbook (first section): summer 1989, 
autumn 1994, winter 1999 and summer 2003 Toyo Keizai Inc.
The Determinants of Capital Structure, an Empirical Study of Japanese Companies
―　　―257
leverage.
4.2 Size
The sales and employment correlations (used as the proxies for size — see tables: 8, 9, 10
and 11 respectively) are negative, and in many cases statistically significant (especially
employment, tables 10 and 11). Almost all correlations whose t value is higher than 2.31
have noted negative values (see table 8). The only industry that displayed strong positive
correlation was pharmaceuticals (0.8514 in 2003). The strongest negative correlations in
1988 were displayed by steel products (– 0.8968) and glass and ceramics (– 0.8204), in 1993 by
steel products (– 0.6924), in 1999 again by steel products (– 0.7501). In 2003 there was no
single case of strong negative correlation. The average correlation was decreasing with time
(from – 0.2594 in 1988 to – 0.07 in 2003).
In terms of averages, similar results we obtain when measuring relationship between size
and financial leverage (disregarding the choice of leverage measure). There are some
differences in the results for individual industries. Only glass and ceramics and steel products
Table 7 Coefficients of Correlation: Earnings per share / Financial Leverage in 13 Japanese 
Manufacturing Industries 1988–2003
r(EARNINGS PER SHARE / TOTAL ASSETS, DEBT / TOTAL ASSETS
INDUSTRY
change: 2003–19882003199919931988
– 0.1231– 0.6339– 0.4651– 0.6782– 0.5108textile & apparel
– 0.1020– 0.6240– 0.6229– 0.7724– 0.5220pulp & paper
– 0.0817– 0.6216– 0.8333– 0.8115– 0.5399chemicals
– 0.1373– 0.5952– 0.0919– 0.1643– 0.4579pharmaceuticals
0.0444– 0.5508– 0.4726– 0.5273– 0.5952oil&coal products
– 0.3265– 0.7501– 0.4688– 0.0614– 0.4236rubber products
– 0.1716– 0.6167– 0.3014– 0.2942– 0.4451glass & ceramics
– 0.0892– 0.8873– 0.4191– 0.8053– 0.7980steel products
– 0.1794– 0.4877– 0.6431– 0.5601– 0.3083metal products
0.1517– 0.4616– 0.00060.0749– 0.6133machinery
– 0.5015– 0.7490– 0.2891– 0.1894– 0.2475electrical machinery
– 0.4183– 0.7007– 0.6368– 0.6449– 0.2824transport equipment
– 0.4861– 0.5636– 0.5228– 0.5286– 0.0776precision instruments
– 0.1862– 0.6340– 0.4437– 0.4587– 0.4478average
– 0.2677– 0.2352– 0.3699– 0.2117– 0.2540for all industries
Source: Calculations based on data from Japan Company Handbook (first section): summer 1989, 
autumn 1994, winter 1999 and summer 2003 Toyo Keizai Inc.
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Table 8 Coefficients of Correlation: Size / Financial Leverage in 13 Japanese Manufacturing 
Industries 1988–2003
r(SALES / TOTAL ASSETS, DEBT / (DEBT + EQUITY)
INDUSTRY
change: 2003–19882003199919931988
– 0.0730– 0.3621– 0.20210.0200– 0.2890textile & apparel
– 0.0511– 0.5545– 0.5843– 0.5760– 0.5034pulp & paper
0.5443– 0.1535– 0.2997– 0.6583– 0.6978chemicals
0.70090.85140.47850.13070.1504pharmaceuticals
– 0.22800.2176– 0.13140.10050.4456oil&coal products
0.35520.23020.29330.1189– 0.1250rubber products
0.3284– 0.4920– 0.6165– 0.6586– 0.8204glass & ceramics
0.4919– 0.4049– 0.7501– 0.6924– 0.8968steel products
0.1039– 0.0956– 0.6629– 0.5944– 0.1995metal products
0.2004– 0.3132– 0.0910– 0.0752– 0.5136machinery
0.17380.34530.18190.02980.1715electrical machinery
– 0.5995– 0.5504– 0.5413– 0.20330.0491transport equipment
0.51460.3713– 0.53590.0466– 0.1433precision instruments
0.1894– 0.0700– 0.2663– 0.2317– 0.2594average
0.19700.0390– 0.1123– 0.0124– 0.1580for all industries
Source: Calculations based on data from Japan Company Handbook (first section): summer 1989, 
autumn 1994, winter 1999 and summer 2003 Toyo Keizai Inc.
Table 9 Coefficients of Correlation: Size / Financial Leverage in 13 Japanese Manufacturing 
Industries 1988–2003
r(SALES / TOTAL ASSETS, DEBT / TOTAL ASSETS
INDUSTRY
change: 2003–19882003199919931988
– 0.0963– 0.3671– 0.1495– 0.0199– 0.2708textile & apparel
– 0.0772– 0.5867– 0.6558– 0.6670– 0.5095pulp & paper
0.1146– 0.2139– 0.3361– 0.6114– 0.3285chemicals
0.68940.85380.42730.17090.1644pharmaceuticals
– 0.2865– 0.0004– 0.0262– 0.04990.2860oil&coal products
0.29160.18890.19060.1475– 0.1027rubber products
0.1540– 0.5858– 0.6735– 0.6294– 0.7398glass & ceramics
0.4140– 0.4727– 0.7854– 0.6862– 0.8866steel products
0.1725– 0.1531– 0.7337– 0.5606– 0.3256metal products
0.1872– 0.36990.0487– 0.0148– 0.5571machinery
– 0.08370.31750.0427– 0.21460.4012electrical machinery
– 0.6557– 0.6759– 0.4187– 0.0874– 0.0202transport equipment
0.41090.2925– 0.59650.0550– 0.1185precision instruments
0.211 – 0.1364– 0.2820– 0.2437– 0.2314average
– 0.1382– 0.0849– 0.2353– 0.0789– 0.1538for all industries
Source: Calculations based on data from Japan Company Handbook (first section): summer 1989, 
autumn 1994, winter 1999 and summer 2003 Toyo Keizai Inc.
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display strong negative correlations and were observed in almost all periods. The strongest
negative correlations in 1988 were displayed by steel products (– 0.8866) and glass and
ceramics (– 0.7398), in 1993 again by steel products (– 0.6862) and pulp and paper (– 0.667), in
1999 by steel products (– 0.7854) and metal products (– 0.7337), and in 2003 by transport
equipment (– 6759). There is only one case of strong positive correlation in whole sample,
which is pharmaceuticals that displayed positive change over time absolute correlations (from
weak 0.1644 in 1988 to strong 0.8538 in 2003). There are two industries that displayed strong
negative correlations during almost whole period (glass and ceramics and steel products). The
biggest negative change in time was displayed in transport equipment (from – 0.0202 in 1988
to – 0.6759 in 2003 (see table 9, and compare also transport equipment from table 8; change
form 0.0491 in 1988 to – 0.5504 in 2003).
In case of employment as a proxy for size the average coefficients had lower values (see
table 10 and 11). However, there were less industries that displayed strong negative
correlations (in 1993 there was only one industry that displayed strong negative correlation —
glass and ceramics (– 0.7113)). In 1988 the strongest negative correlations were in glass and
Table 10 Coefficients of Correlation: Size / Financial Leverage in 13 Japanese Manufacturing 
Industries 1988–2003
r(EMPLOYMENT / TOTAL ASSETS, DEBT / (DEBT + EQUITY)
INDUSTRY
change: 2003–19882003199919931988
– 0.1709– 0.6333– 0.3577– 0.1256– 0.4624textile & apparel
– 0.0856– 0.7557– 0.4517– 0.4878– 0.6701pulp & paper
– 0.2088– 0.1171– 0.0241– 0.01600.0917chemicals
0.68370.86450.63910.30750.1808pharmaceuticals
0.0632– 0.5492– 0.7448– 0.5856– 0.6124oil&coal products
– 0.1852– 0.5431– 0.07220.1551– 0.3578rubber products
0.2338– 0.5892– 0.5932– 0.7113– 0.8230glass & ceramics
– 0.4207– 0.7144– 0.3971– 0.4318– 0.2937steel products
0.0684– 0.1813– 0.4100– 0.1459– 0.2497metal products
0.0397– 0.5537– 0.45340.0413– 0.5934machinery
– 0.1624– 0.1133– 0.24480.33380.0491electrical machinery
0.34050.32560.1197– 0.3763– 0.0150transport equipment
– 0.4236– 0.3859– 0.21940.30200.0377precision instruments
– 0.0175– 0.3035– 0.2469– 0.1339– 0.2860average
– 0.0174– 0.3766– 0.3072– 0.2895– 0.3592for all industries
Source: Calculations based on data from Japan Company Handbook (first section): summer 1989, 
autumn 1994, winter 1999 and summer 2003 Toyo Keizai Inc.
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ceramics (– 0.823), in 1993 again in glass and ceramics (– 0.7113); in 1999 in oil and coal
products (– 0.7448), and in 2003 in pulp and paper (– 0.7557) and steel products (-0.7144).
There is only one case of strong positive correlation which is pharmaceuticals with strong
positive correlations in two periods: 1999 and 2003 (respectively, 0.6391 and 0.8645) There are
two industries that displayed strong negative values of coefficients during almost all period
(glass and ceramics and oil and coal products).
In debt to total assets, glass and ceramics has shown (as the only industry) strong negative
correlation in whole period of 1988–2003 (see table 11). In other industries, correlations
display similar values (disregarding the choice of the measure of leverage). Again,
pharmaceuticals showed similar change of correlation in time from weak 0.205 in 1988 to
strong positive 0.891 in 2003.
The negative correlations with regard to company size means that size may represents a
degree of informational asymmetry running counter static theory interpreting the size variable
as an inverse measure for bankruptcy risk (default probability). The size variable represents
also a risk variable since large companies are less inclined to go bankrupt. The negative sign
Table 11 Coefficients of Correlation: Size / Financial Leverage in 13 Japanese Manufacturing 
Industries 1988–2003
r(EMPLOYMENT / TOTAL ASSETS, DEBT / TOTAL ASSETS
INDUSTRY
change: 2003–19882003199919931988
– 0.2099– 0.6353– 0.3228– 0.1443– 0.4254textile & apparel
– 0.1514– 0.7497– 0.5940– 0.4970– 0.5982pulp & paper
– 0.6178– 0.1474– 0.0751– 0.04610.4703chemicals
0.68600.89100.61230.35080.2050pharmaceuticals
– 0.0156– 0.5531– 0.6898– 0.4571– 0.5375oil&coal products
– 0.2295– 0.5545– 0.13950.2415– 0.3251rubber products
0.1326– 0.6133– 0.6344– 0.6751– 0.7459glass & ceramics
– 0.3976– 0.7071– 0.4003– 0.4567– 0.3095steel products
0.1372– 0.2435– 0.4704– 0.1151– 0.3806metal products
– 0.0067– 0.6289– 0.00360.3118– 0.6222machinery
– 0.3068– 0.0306– 0.34820.30690.2762electrical machinery
– 0.0572– 0.18840.1795– 0.3826– 0.1312transport equipment
– 0.5011– 0.4598– 0.29200.33010.0413precision instruments
– 0.1183– 0.3554– 0.2445– 0.0948– 0.2371average
– 0.3333– 0.4074– 0.3137– 0.2646– 0.3476for all industries
Source: Calculations based on data from Japan Company Handbook (first section): summer 1989, 
autumn 1994, winter 1999 and summer 2003 Toyo Keizai Inc.
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of size variable is interesting because large firms are a priori expected to have relatively more
debt than smaller companies because bankruptcy cost is expected to be of a lesser risk in larger
firms. Also because the asymmetric-information costs are expected to be smaller in such
firms large firms may therefore be expected to have more debt.
Large firms often have a more dispersed ownership structure compared to smaller
firms. The dispersion of ownership would have a negative influence on debt level because to
have full control of a firm, an investor must have relative majority of stocks. It may be
argued that ownership structure in smaller firms may demand more debt than in larger firms.
It is, however, doubtful whether negative relationship between size and leverage supports this
assertion. The sample under study consists of the biggest manufacturing corporations, and
does not include small and medium companies.
4.3 Uniqueness
The study of correlation between uniqueness and leverage show that there is no relation-
ship that is of statistical significance (tables 12, 13 respectively). However, there are a few
Table 12 Coefficients of Correlation: Uniqueness / Financial Leverage in 13 Japanese Manu-
facturing Industries 1988–2003
r(R&D EXPENDITURES / SALES, DEBT / (DEBT + EQUITY)
INDUSTRY
change: 2003–19882003199919931988
0.52580.33890.17380.0459– 0.1869textile & apparel
1.15120.4303– 0.2789– 0.1063– 0.7208pulp & paper
– 0.4096– 0.4293– 0.0934– 0.1771– 0.0196chemicals
0.2907– 0.12810.12990.3051– 0.4188pharmaceuticals
– 0.1266– 0.6976– 0.46120.2964– 0.5710oil&coal products
– 0.23820.4096– 0.45210.06830.6478rubber products
– 0.5754– 0.6807– 0.0256– 0.4223– 0.1054glass & ceramics
– 0.8593– 0.01430.65030.69020.8450steel products
0.2271– 0.4626– 0.1546– 0.1368– 0.6897metal products
– 1.0179– 0.6095– 0.93020.12210.4084machinery
– 0.8637– 0.8013– 0.40560.40640.0624electrical machinery
0.81070.3437– 0.4688– 0.5765– 0.4670transport equipment
– 0.4111– 0.29000.0623– 0.29860.1210precision instruments
– 0.1151– 0.1993– 0.17340.0167– 0.0842average
– 0.0953– 0.3875– 0.4506– 0.3214– 0.2922for all industries
Source: Calculations based on data from Japan Company Handbook (first section): summer 1989, 
autumn 1994, winter 1999 and summer 2003 Toyo Keizai Inc.
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examples of the industries that have displayed strong negative and strong positive correlations,
especially when the debt to capital ratio was chosen as the measure of the leverage (see table 12).
In 1988, pulp and paper and metal products displayed strong negative correlations (respectively
– 0.7208 and – 0.6897) and steel products and rubber products, strong positive ones (0.845 and
0.6478). In 1993 the only strong correlation was displayed by steel products industry (0.6902).
In 1999 it was machinery that showed the strongest correlation (– 0.9302). In 2003 all strong
correlations were negative: electrical machinery (– 0.8013), oil and coal products (– 0.6976), and
glass and ceramics (– 0.6807). The values of coefficients of correlations were close to zero on
average, although the aggregate values for all industry were negative in all four periods.
Regarding total assets, average values of correlations displayed similar values (see table
13). There are fewer cases of strong negative correlations than in case of debt to capital,
however, values of correlations are lower in almost all cases (also positive correlations are
lower). Metal products and glass and ceramics are the cases of industry that obtained strong/
moderate negative values of coefficients through whole period 1988–2003.
Due to high demand for funds one might expect a positive relationship between
uniqueness and leverage, or, a negative relationship due to higher costs of financial distress.
Table 13 Coefficients of Correlation: Uniqueness / Financial Leverage in 13 Japanese Manu-
facturing Industries 1988–2003
r(R&D EXPENDITURES / SALES, DEBT / TOTAL ASSETS
INDUSTRY
change: 2003–19882003199919931988
0.57830.30140.33090.1179– 0.2769textile & apparel
0.65270.0545– 0.3904– 0.1639– 0.5983pulp & paper
– 0.6829– 0.5289– 0.1938– 0.72330.1539chemicals
0.82080.51050.54930.3403– 0.3103pharmaceuticals
0.1707– 0.36280.11870.4917– 0.5335oil&coal products
– 0.01170.5266– 0.53460.25070.5383rubber products
– 0.1322– 0.6812– 0.3192– 0.6612– 0.5490glass & ceramics
– 0.7176– 0.20080.41080.37520.5168steel products
0.1849– 0.4262– 0.6696– 0.3046– 0.6111metal products
0.0341– 0.5655– 0.83350.4685– 0.5996machinery
– 0.7016– 0.3951– 0.33560.52850.3064electrical machinery
0.0744– 0.1340– 0.3970– 0.3214– 0.2084transport equipment
– 0.5175– 0.2501– 0.2483– 0.30220.2674precision instruments
– 0.0190– 0.1655– 0.19330.0074– 0.1465average
– 0.3328– 0.3446– 0.3446– 0.2974– 0.3446for all industries
Source: Calculations based on data from Japan Company Handbook (first section): summer 1989, 
autumn 1994, winter 1999 and summer 2003 Toyo Keizai Inc.
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This study shows that the relationship between uniqueness and leverage is not statistically
significant. This may be explain by the possibility that the effects of the two different theories
(pecking order and tradeoff theory) neutralize each other, and in case of strong positive and
negative relationships each theory play reflects in financing behavior of different industry.
There are few cases of a significant positive relationship between debt levels and uniqueness.
This would be consistent with the pecking order hypothesis (if borrowing is being used to fund
investment opportunities) because firm would issue debt rather than external equity.
Ratio of R&D expenditures over sales is also used as a proxy of other capital structure
determinant that is expected growth, however, looking at the results, other more significant
results might be obtained by using another measure for expected growth, such as market-to-
book ratio, a commonly used proxy for expected growth.
4.4 Expected growth
Regarding expected growth the correlations display similar results to those between
uniqueness and leverage. It seems that there is no significant relationship here (see tables 14,
15 respectively). There are however, examples of several industries that have displayed
Table 14 Coefficients of Correlation: Expected growth / Financial Leverage in 13 Japa-
nese Manufacturing Industries 1988–2003
r(INVESTMENTS / TOTAL ASSETS, DEBT / (DEBT + EQUITY)
INDUSTRY
2003–19882003199919931988
0.75780.0230– 0.3597– 0.0143– 0.7347textile & apparel
0.34370.1314– 0.5895– 0.6689– 0.2123pulp & paper
0.3691– 0.0600– 0.1813– 0.3720– 0.4291chemicals
– 0.39760.14330.5274– 0.35490.5409pharmaceuticals
– 0.0730– 0.21810.46840.2999– 0.1451oil&coal products
0.35460.3409– 0.00820.5312– 0.0136rubber products
0.5126– 0.14920.2692– 0.1123– 0.6618glass & ceramics
– 0.8899– 0.38800.50310.14680.5019steel products
0.60090.15480.1426– 0.1778– 0.4462metal products
0.1766– 0.5722– 0.7563– 0.1298– 0.7488machinery
– 0.9239– 0.3536– 0.2310– 0.25450.5703electrical machinery
– 0.1317– 0.2638– 0.5245– 0.1604– 0.1321transport equipment
0.0455– 0.1174– 0.2688– 0.2782– 0.1629precision instruments
0.0573– 0.1022– 0.0776– 0.1189– 0.1595average
0.1343– 0.0071– 0.09110.0324– 0.1415for all industries
Source: Calculations based on data from Japan Company Handbook (first section): summer 
1989, autumn 1994, winter 1999 and summer 2003 Toyo Keizai Inc.
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strong negative and moderate positive correlations. In 1988 machinery, textiles, and glass and
ceramics displayed strong negative correlations (respectively – 0.7488, – 0.7347 and – 0.6618,
see table 14). However, in the remaining periods the only strong correlations were displayed,
in 1993, by pulp and paper (– 0.6689) and in 1999 by machinery (– 0.7653). On average, the
values of coefficients of correlations were close to zero, also similar to the average values of
correlations between uniqueness and debt ratios.
As to total assets, average correlations display similar values (see table 15). In 1988,
again the strongest negative correlations were displayed by textiles, glass and ceramics, and
machinery (respectively – 0.7153, – 0.6594 and – 0.6249). In 1988 there was one industry
which displayed strong positive correlation (electrical machinery, 0.6505). All other strong
correlations in remaining period were negative; in 1993 pulp and paper (– 0.7569), in 1999
machinery (– 0.7077) and pulp and paper (– 0.6597).
The results obtained here show that, similarly to the uniqueness variable, there is no
statistically significant relationship. Based on these results, the two theories (i.e. pecking
order and tradeoff theory), may seem to neutralize each other.
Table 15 Coefficients of Correlation: Expected growth / Financial Leverage in 13 Japa-
nese Manufacturing Industries 1988–2003
r(INVESTMENTS / TOTAL ASSETS, DEBT / TOTAL ASSETS
INDUSTRY
2003–19882003199919931988
0.72450.0092– 0.30980.0051– 0.7153textile & apparel
0.47800.1776– 0.6597– 0.7569– 0.3003pulp & paper
0.4620– 0.0798– 0.1835– 0.4847– 0.5418chemicals
– 0.39240.15100.4931– 0.35240.5434pharmaceuticals
– 0.1522– 0.12800.40750.46920.0241oil&coal products
0.23690.29290.01480.60080.0560rubber products
0.5349– 0.12450.3509– 0.1099– 0.6594glass & ceramics
– 0.8895– 0.34910.51520.18530.5404steel products
0.65400.22450.2045– 0.1611– 0.4295metal products
0.0995– 0.5255– 0.7077– 0.0059– 0.6249machinery
– 0.9531– 0.3026– 0.2654– 0.17430.6505electrical machinery
– 0.4182– 0.3545– 0.39900.03540.0637transport equipment
0.1237– 0.0364– 0.2922– 0.2754– 0.1601precision instruments
0.0391– 0.0804– 0.0640– 0.0788– 0.1195average
0.1371– 0.0044– 0.06480.0245– 0.1415for all industries
Source: Calculations based on data from Japan Company Handbook (first section): summer 
1989, autumn 1994, winter 1999 and summer 2003 Toyo Keizai Inc.
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4.5 Tangibility
Consistent with the debt-equity literature the coefficients of tangibility tend to be highly
significant, which may be regarding as supporting the agency cost and static optimal capital
structure theories. Firms with high tangible asset ratios tend to raise leverage due to the
abundance of assets they can easily put up as collateral29). Fixed assets do have a positive
effect on interest-carrying debt. However, the elasticity can differ varying on the asset’s
liquidation value. An asset that has a low liquidation value cannot be mortgaged in the same
way as an asset that has a high liquidation value. A bank considers the total value of firm
when they offered the loan, and hence fixed assets may not be such an important factor behind
the level of debt for the firm. A positive correlations between tangibility and leverage seem to
support recommendations of the agency cost theory and optimal static capital structure theory
(bankruptcy cost)30).
4.6 Non-debt tax shield
Non-debt tax shield seems to have no significant impact on total debt ratio (see table 16).
This may run counter to the recommendations of the optimal static capital structure theory —
(corporate tax shield). In our study there was no single case of the industry displaying strong
correlation. The moderate negative correlation was observed in case of pharmaceuticals in
2003 (– 0.5188 and – 0.5337, respectively for debt to total assets and debt to capital), in
average, however, correlations are close to zero.
Most of empirical studies also do not confirm that non-debt tax shield have significant
impact on financial leverage31).
29) See: Bevan, A. A. and Danbolt, J., ‘Capital structure and its determinants in the United Kingdom:
a decompositional analysis’, University of Glasgow, 2000, Van der Wijst, N., ‘A new approach to
firm evaluation’, Annals of Operations Research, 45, 1993, and Michaelas, N., Chittenden, F. and
Poutziouris, P., ‘Financial Policy and Capital Structure Choice in U. K.: Empirical Evidence from
Company Panel Data, Small Business Economics, 1999.
30) Regardning tangibility, strong, positive correlations for Japanese companies were observed in, for
example: Hirota, S., ‘Are Corporate Financing Decisions Different in Japan? An Empirical
Study on Capital Structure’, IFMP Discussion Paper, 1998, Nishioka, S. and Baba, N., ‘Dynamic
Capital Structure of Japanese Firms’, Bank of Japan, 2004.
31) Bradley, M., Jarrel, G. A., and Kim, E. H., ‘On the Existence of an Optimal capital Structure,
theory and Evidence’, Journal of Finance, 39, 1984, March, P., ‘The Choice Between Debt and
Equity: An empirical study’, Journal of Finance, 27, 1982, and Titman, S. Wessels, R., ‘The
Determinants of Capital Structure’, Journal of Finance, 43, 1988.
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4.7 Dividend
Dividend has a negative effect on total debt (see table 17 and 18). The results show that
dividend is indeed a significant determinant of leverage (respectively, table 17 and 18).
Almost all correlations whose t value is higher than 2.31 have displayed negative values. The
only positive correlation was in steel products in 1999 (0.6254, see table 17). The strongest
negative correlations in 1988 were displayed by chemicals (– 0.7583) and steel products
(– 0.7403), in 1993 by chemicals (– 0.8857), pulp and paper (– 0.8152), and precision
instruments (– 0.7977), in 1999 by precision instruments (– 0.77965) and chemicals (– 0.7587),
and in 2003 by electrical machinery (– 0.7984). The biggest positive change in time was
observed in electrical machinery (from – 0.3851 in 1988 to – 0.7984 in 2003). Although the
averages for 1988 and 2003 are similar (respectively – 0.5265 and – 0.5722) they display
weaker correlations (– 0.402 in 1993 and – 0.4171 in 1999). There are many examples of
industries that showed strong negative correlations during almost whole period (pulp and
paper, chemicals, oil and coal products, metal products, machinery and precision instruments).
Table 16 Coefficients of Correlation: Non-debt tax shield / Financial Leverage 
in 13 Japanese Manufacturing Industries 1988–2003
r(NON-DEBT TAX SHIELD. LEVERAGE)
INDUSTRY 2003
21
0.42730.4235textile & apparel
0.22180.1524pulp & paper
– 0.3756– 0.3661chemicals
– 0.5337– 0.5188pharmaceuticals
0.26780.1974oil&coal products
0.06640.0716rubber products
0.35260.4326glass & ceramics
0.48430.4401steel products
– 0.1906– 0.2182metal products
– 0.1846– 0.2874machinery
0.23860.2504electrical machinery
0.0694– 0.2988transport equipment
– 0.3530– 0.3884precision instruments
0.0378– 0.0084average
0.11370.1684for all industries
Source: Calculations based on data from Japan Company Handbook (first section): 
summer 1989, autumn 1994, winter 1999 and summer 2003 Toyo Keizai Inc.
Note: 1) leverage = debt/(debt+equity), 2) leverage = debt/ total assets
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Regarding debt to total assets, average values of correlations are weaker, compared with
debt to capital, but are still statistically significant (see table 18). There, there are fewer cases
of strong negative correlations. Pulp and paper, chemicals, metal products and precision
instruments are industries with strong negative correlations through all the period of 1988–
2003. Steel products is the only industry with a strong positive correlation (0.6205 in 1999).
The negative dividend correlations may suggest that firms that pay out dividends also
prefer to have less debt than other firms, ceteris paribus. This relationship is in line with
recommendations of pecking order theory (lower asymmetry information costs) and runs
counter agency cost theory and tradeoff theory (that asserts that companies with low
probability of bankruptcy tend to have more debt). These results do not seem to support an
argument that the firms prefer to pay out dividends while having much debt because they need
to be in the capital market to obtain cost-efficient monitoring of their management.
Table 17 Coefficients of Correlation: Dividend / Financial Leverage in 13 Japanese Manufac-
turing Industries 1988–2003
r(DIVIDEND PER SHARE / TOTAL ASSETS, DEBT / (DEBT + EQUITY)
INDUSTRY
change: 2003–19882003199919931988
0.1419– 0.5094– 0.4258– 0.4182– 0.6513textile & apparel
– 0.3219– 0.6303– 0.6122– 0.8152– 0.3084pulp & paper
0.0953– 0.6630– 0.7587– 0.8857– 0.7583chemicals
– 0.2187– 0.6763– 0.5559– 0.5041– 0.4577pharmaceuticals
0.0475– 0.6016– 0.6285– 0.6565– 0.6491oil&coal products
0.2572– 0.1278– 0.15790.1881– 0.3850rubber products
0.2552– 0.4122– 0.0429– 0.5319– 0.6673glass & ceramics
0.2606– 0.47970.62540.4287– 0.7403steel products
– 0.0778– 0.6294– 0.3689– 0.6179– 0.5516metal products
0.0053– 0.6335– 0.53130.0184– 0.6389machinery
– 0.4133– 0.7984– 0.5486– 0.3659– 0.3851electrical machinery
– 0.3448– 0.6557– 0.6203– 0.2687– 0.3108transport equipment
– 0.2807– 0.6210– 0.7965– 0.7977– 0.3403precision instruments
– 0.0457– 0.5722– 0.4171– 0.4020– 0.5265average
– 0.0270– 0.3695– 0.3912– 0.1423– 0.3424for all industries
Source: Calculations based on data from Japan Company Handbook (first section): summer 1989, 
autumn 1994, winter 1999 and summer 2003 Toyo Keizai Inc.
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4.8 Market-to-book ratio
There is a negative correlation between market-to-book ratio and leverage32). This result
implies that the negative effects incurred by both agency cost (under-investment) and market
timing hypotheses dominate, although are in some cases almost balanced by a decline in the
default probability. Recommendations of tradeoff theory do not seem to be supported
(adjusting target debt ratio).
As for statistical results, and the choice of leverage measures, there were stronger
correlations displayed by industries when the leverage was measured as the ratio of debt to
capital. There were 526 negative correlations (83%). For debt to capital, there were 108
strong correlations (100 negative and 8 positive) correlations contrasting with only 90 strong
correlations for debt to total assets (86 negative and 4 positive). For both variables (debt to
total assets and debt to capital) the strongest correlations were displayed by pulp and paper
industry, steel products, glass and ceramics and chemicals (respectively 27, 23, 23, and 21
32) Nishioka, S. and Baba, N., ‘Dynamic Capital Structure of Japanese Firms’, Bank of Japan, 2004.
Table 18 Coefficients of Correlation: Dividend / Financial Leverage in 13 Japanese Manufac-
turing Industries 1988–2003
r(DIVIDEND PER SHARE / TOTAL ASSETS, DEBT / TOTAL ASSETS
INDUSTRY
change: 2003–19882003199919931988
– 0.0080– 0.5068– 0.4404– 0.4304– 0.4989textile & apparel
– 0.4339– 0.6112– 0.6340– 0.8999– 0.1772pulp & paper
– 0.1086– 0.6067– 0.7375– 0.7938– 0.4981chemicals
– 0.1945– 0.6860– 0.5443– 0.5164– 0.4914pharmaceuticals
0.0519– 0.5385– 0.4204– 0.5599– 0.5904oil&coal products
0.2431– 0.1158– 0.19230.1387– 0.3589rubber products
0.1795– 0.4002– 0.0264– 0.5041– 0.5797glass & ceramics
0.3145– 0.40390.62050.4203– 0.7184steel products
– 0.1296– 0.6316– 0.3363– 0.6293– 0.5020metal products
0.0940– 0.5577– 0.27750.1263– 0.6517machinery
– 0.3943– 0.8071– 0.4526– 0.2173– 0.4128electrical machinery
– 0.4177– 0.8812– 0.5879– 0.3257– 0.4635transport equipment
– 0.2072– 0.5541– 0.8105– 0.8104– 0.3469precision instruments
0.0493– 0.5616– 0.3723– 0.3848– 0.4838average
– 0.3021– 0.3655– 0.3824– 0.1501– 0.3103for all industries
Source: Calculations based on data from Japan Company Handbook (first section): summer 1989, 
autumn 1994, winter 1999 and summer 2003 Toyo Keizai Inc. 
The Determinants of Capital Structure, an Empirical Study of Japanese Companies
―　　―269
strong correlations). The weakest correlations were in rubber products and transport
equipment (5 and 7 strong correlations). Almost all strong correlations (92%) were negative.
There were 29 cases where industries (especially, pulp and paper industry, chemicals, steel
products, and glass and ceramics) have displayed strong negative coefficients in all (or almost
all) periods (in contrast to rubber industry, metal, electrical machinery, transport equipment and
oil and coal industry).
Recommendations in line with pecking order hypothesis, and agency costs and corporate
structure theory seem to be reflected in debt financing behavior of Japanese companies, but
much further work needs to be done especially trying to explain the institutional, structural,
dynamic and static determinants of capital structure in Japanese companies.
5. Conclusion
In this study correlation analysis has been used to identify and measure the most
significant factors affecting capital structure of Japanese manufacturing industry in the period
of 1988–2003. The results suggest that the capital structure of the Japanese manufacturing
industry is significantly affected by: profitability, dividend, tangibility, market-to-book ratio
and size. The only variables suggested by theoretical and empirical literature that seem not to
affect capital structure of Japanese manufacturing industries are: uniqueness, growth
opportunities and non-debt tax shield variable (although the lack of significant statistical
relationship be a result of conflicting theories that neutralize each other).
Generally, the effect of a relatively high return is less debt. Total debt is reduced when
the companies have a high return. This result has its economic rationale in the pecking-order
hypothesis where firms prefer retained earnings to debt. This seems to contradict at the same
time the recommendations of static optimal capital structure theory and free-cash-flow
hypothesis. The negative correlations between size and leverage may suggest that size
represents the degree of informational symmetry running counter static theory interpreting the
size variable to be an inverse measure for bankruptcy risk (default probability). The size
variable contains also elements of a risk variable since large companies are less inclined to go
bankrupt. The negative sign of the size variable is interesting because large firms are a priori
expected to have relatively more debt than smaller companies because bankruptcy cost is
expected to be of a lesser consideration in larger firms and because the asymmetric-information
costs are expected to be smaller in such firms.
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Moreover, due to high demand for funds one might expect a positive correlation between
uniqueness and leverage, or, a negative correlation due to higher costs of financial
distress. Although there are few exceptions, the results of this study show that there is no
statistically significant relationship. One possible explanation may be that the effects of the
two different theories neutralize each other, and in case of strong positive and negative
relationships each theory differently reflects in industry/companies’ financing decision. This
may also explain the lack of significant statistical correlation between opportunity growth and
leverage. There is also weak correlation between non-debt tax shields, which a priori may
contradict tradeoff theory. Coefficients of tangibility are statistically significant, which may
support the assumptions of agency cost and static optimal capital structure. Firms with high
tangible asset ratios tend to raise leverage due to the abundance of assets they can easily put up
as collateral.
The negative effect from dividends to total debt shows that firms that pay out dividends
also prefer to have less debt than other firms. This relationship is in line with recommenda-
tions of pecking order theory and runs counter tradeoff theory. Finally, the negative correla-
tion between market-to-book ratio and leverage implies that the negative effects suggested by
both theories, agency cost (under-investment) and market timing hypotheses dominate,
although are almost balanced by the positive effect from a decline in the default probability.
In general, as for the results of this study, some recommendations, especially of the peck-
ing order, agency cost and governance structure (less in case of static optimal capital structure
hypothesis) seem to be supported by this study. Among control variables, profitability and
dividend have high explanatory power as a proxy for pecking-order theory.
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